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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
China has become one of the most popular foreign direct investment 
(FDI) destinations since 1980s, and its automotive industry always an 
attractive playing field for the global automakers. As there was a gap 
in the passenger car market in before the 1980s, all the domestic 
manufacturers mainly at that time only produced trucks and buses for 
transportation, tractors for agriculture, and jeeps for military. Thus, 
the entry seems very necessary to supply this gap in the market; the 
early entry will help them to win the first move advantage. For 
European and U.S. automakers, the entry into China has become part 
of their global strategy. They strive to build up a business base in the 
Far East that will limit the dominance of Japanese firms. 
 
From a global strategy point of view, the step of entry into China 
seems very necessary; however, Chinas unstable institutional 
environment and different kinds of regulation limit the speed of entry. 
What the Chinese government wants to achieve through publishing 
the regulations to foreign funds, is to foster its own automotive 
industry and is not interested in turning China into an expansion base 
for European, American and Japanese auto industries. Simply, the 
government does not want to lose the control on this pillar industry 
while it opens to the world. Till the mid-1990s, the auto industry was 
still highly protected in China; high tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, 
screening, foreign equity limits and local content requirements are 
several common obstacles to the entry of foreigners. 
 
In the past, many researchers have studied the policies in Chinas 
automotive industry, but most of them mainly focus on two questions: 
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how does the protection environment in the auto industry affect the 
utility of domestic consumer by limiting their access to the cheaper 
import car?; and, how does the protected environment limit the 
development of the industry? Most of articles argued that the policy 
environment in China provides too much protection and is not good 
for the growth of domestic manufacturers. However, there are few 
studies focused on the foreign perspective; this paper would change 
the angle from the domestic side to foreign side. This paper looks to 
explore the link between policy regulations and entry model selection. 
In order to analyse this link, two famous joint ventures in the China 
automotive industry has been selected for study, the Shanghai 
Volkswagen and Guangzhou Peugeot. In the case, three dimensions 
about the entry strategy of these two companies will be analyzed. 
Finally, this paper is going to answer the question of whether the 
regulation is the main factor affect foreigners entry model selection 
and whether the limited availability of the entry model would be the 
important factor that affects the performance of joint ventures. 
 
In this paper, there are four main sections: Literature review, 
Methodology, Research analysis, and Conclusion. In the literature 
review section (Chapter 2), all the related theories and models about 
the entry model selection and entry strategies will be presented. The 
methodology (Chapter 3) will explain the research method of this 
research applied, the way to access the data, and the limitation of this 
research as well. Research analysis is a large section. All economic 
factors and regulations related to how foreign funds get in Chinas 
automotive industry will be analyzed in Chapter 4. The case studies of 
Shanghai Volkswagen and Guangzhou Peugeot will be shown in 
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 respectively; the three dimensions of entry 
strategy of each joint venture: partner selection, control over alliance, 
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and conflict management will be fully analyzed here. Finally, this 
paper is going to present some implications through the comparison 
of Shanghai Volkswagen and Guangzhou Peugeot cases, and end with 
a conclusion: Regulation and Policy, in some degree, limit the number 
of available entry model choices to the foreigner, but any limitation on 
the entry model selection should not fully be responsible to the 
performance of the foreign funds in this industry. By implementing 
and designing a right entry strategy based on the assumption of limit 
entry model choice, the foreign funds can still perform very well. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
 
There are two main parts in this chapter, the first part (section 2.1) 
will have a discussion about what and how factors take into account 
when making the choice about entry mode selection. The 
attractiveness of the locational factor make foreign companies like to 
enter China, however, the limitation by regulation make Joint Venture 
become the most popular mode of entry. Thus, the second part of the 
literature review (section 2.2) will mainly focus on three dimensions 
of the entry strategy of forming Joint Ventures: Partner selection 
(section 2.2.1), Control over alliance (2.2.2), and conflict 
management (section 2.2.3). 
 
2.1 Entry mode selection 
 
A mode of entry is an institutional arrangement chosen by the firm to 
operate in the foreign market. This decision is one of the most critical 
strategic decisions for the firm. It affects all the future decisions and 
operations of the firm in that country market. Since each mode of 
entry entails a concomitant level of resource commitment, it is 
difficult to change from one entry mode to another without 
considerable loss of time and money (V. Kumar & Velavan 
Subramanian, 1997, p. 53) 
 
2.1.1 Dunnings eclectic OLI framework 
 
John Dunnings (1988, 1993) eclectic OLI framework of foreign direct 
investment as applied to entry mode choice suggests that firms will 
select their entry mode structure by considering three sets of 
 10
variables: Ownership advantages, Location advantages, and 
Internalization advantages. In the light of the research on 
determinants of entry mode selection, scholars tend to agree on these 
three basic categories of factors that a transnational corporation (TNC) 
should take into account in selecting an entry mode, but there is an 
alternative theory also examines the economic rationale of entry 
mode selection, it is Williamsons (1975) transaction cost theory. 
Transaction cost mode state that by choosing the lowest cost mode of 
operation, firms can maximize their performance, however, it is 
reasonable to argue that OLI paradigm is superior to transaction cost 
mode, Andersen (1997) suggests that transaction cost theory applied 
to entry mode selection has typically needed to be modified to include 
non-transaction cost benefits, and Tse et al. (1997) state that 
transaction cost theory stresses firm-specific variables, but ignores 
the impact of locational differences. 
 
Dunnings eclectic framework improves the transaction cost approach 
by including ownership-specific, location-specific as well as 
transaction variables (internalization) in the entry mode decision  
(Anderson, 1997). The first factor include in OLI framework is 
ownership (O). It is argued that TNCs possess proprietary assets that 
enable them to compete with both companies in the home market and 
companies in the overseas market, and that the choice of entry modes 
depends on the nature of the proprietary assets that TNCs possess, 
ownership advantages are concerned with the control issue, the costs 
and benefits (risk) of inter-firm relationships and transactions. The 
second is related to location (L). It is proposed that countries have 
specific location characteristics and TNCs should choose their entry 
modes on the basis of the location characteristics of the country it 
wants to enter, location advantages are concerned with resource 
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commitment issue, the availability and cost of resources. The third is 
related to internalization (I). It is suggested that different amounts of 
transaction costs, and TNCs should choose their entry modes on the 
basis of the transaction costs involved. 
 
Empirical research and studies to OLI 
 
Several studies have empirically examined Dunnings OLI factors and 
mode selection. Brouthers et al. (1996) examined the impact of 
ownership and location variables on entry mode selection in the U.S. 
computer software industry. They found that as ownership and 
location advantages increased, firms tended to utilize more integrated 
(wholly owned) modes of entry, supporting Dunnings framework. Tse 
et al. (1997) examined the impact of ownership, location and 
internalization factors on mode selection within China. They also 
found that, as OLI advantages increased, firms tended to utilize more 
wholly owned modes of entry, again supporting Dunnings framework. 
Further, Tatoglu and Glaister (1998) examined Dunnnings ownership, 
location and internalization factors for firms investing in Turkey. Their 
study was limited to wholly owned and joint venture operations. They 
also found support for Dunnings OLI framework to explain mode 
choice 
 
Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that OLI model is the best model 
applied for making entry modes choice both on theoretical and 
empirical level. 
 
2.1.2 Approaches to addressing how to take OLI factors into account 
 
After discussing the basic categories of factors that TNC should take 
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into account in selecting an entry mode. Its necessary to know there 
are two broad approaches to how to take these factors into account 
while making the decisions. 
 
The first is a simultaneous approach, which looks into all entry modes 
simultaneously as if they are all associated with, and influenced by, a 
set of factors at the same level in the same time-span. Chu & 
Anderson (1992), for example, consider entry modes as being 
associated with such factors as resource commitment, risk exposure 
and control, and take all entry modes as a continuum, from exporting 
to wholly owned subsidiaries. The position of each entry mode in the 
continuum is determined by the degree to which to entry mode is 
subject to the influence of these factors. 
 
The second approach is a hierarchical approach, which examines 
market entry modes sequentially as if they are at different levels of a 
hierarchy. Kumar and Subramaniam (1997) for instance, argue that a 
natural hierarchy exists among market entry modes. All entry modes 
can first be classified into equity and non-equity entry modes: equity 
entry modes include joint ventures, acquisitions and Greenfield 
investments, while non-equity modes include exporting and 
contractual agreements. At the next level, the equity modes and 
non-equity modes can be each further divided into groups of entry 
modes, and so on. There are different groupings of factors that affect 
the selection of market entry modes at different levels of hierarchy. 
Underlying this approach is an assumption that managers consider 
the choice of entry modes sequentially, and consider only a few of the 
critical factors at each level of hierarchy.  
 
Theoretically speaking, the two approaches both have strong points 
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and weak points. Practically speaking, however, the simultaneous 
approach is very demanding in terms of the data needed to gain 
relevant information and the time consumed to collect the data, 
because it takes into account all entry modes and all influential factors 
at the same time. But in the real business world, manager may not 
have the enough resource and time to collect all the data on all entry 
modes and all influential factors, and have to make the decision under 
the constraints. Differently, the hierarchical approach obviously offers 
managers a convenient framework with which to do so, because it 
takes into consideration only a few entry modes and a selection of key 
influential factors at any one time. So in this dissertation, it is mainly 
concerned with strategy making in the real business world, we 
therefore use the hierarchical approach as a framework for the 
analysis of the selection of entry modes in china. 
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Refer to figure 2-a, Tian (2007) proposed hierarchical approach to the 
classification of entry mode. In the below chapters, the analysis will 
follow this classification. At the first level of the hierarchy is the 
Choice of entry mode 
Exporting Investment 
Direct exporting 
Indirect exporting 
Direct Investment Indirect 
Investment  
WFOE 
Greenfield
Acquisition
Joint venture 
Other 
International 
leasing  
Licensing 
Franchising 
Other  
Processing and 
assembly 
Other  
Figure 2-a 
Source: Tian, 2007, p.75 
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division between exporting and investment. The difference between 
them is that exporting is related to the output, or the product, that is 
to be sold once and for all, while investment is related to investing in 
the production process, and is expected to yield a lasting income. At 
the subsequent levels, however, some explanations are in order. We 
begin with the division between foreign direct investment and foreign 
indirect investment. According to United Nations conference on Trade 
and Development and the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD)  
 
Direct investment is a category of cross-border investment made by a resident 
in one economy (the direct investor) with the objective of establishing a lasting 
interest in an enterprise (the direct investment enterprise) that is resident in an 
economy other than that of the direct investor. (OECD, 2008) 
 
But OECD did not define foreign indirect investment, but acknowledge 
that the crucial difference between foreign direct investment and 
foreign indirect investment is that the former involves effective 
foreign equity ownership of the production facilitates in China while 
the latter does not, such as franchising and licensing. 
 
In Tians (2007) new hierarchical model of entry modes, he argued 
that the crucial difference between foreign direct investment and 
foreign indirect investment whether the foreign investor directly 
invests in and owns either all or an effective share of the production 
facilities in an enterprise operating outside the economy of the 
investor so as to acquire a lasting interest. The threshold for an 
effective share is considered to be 25 per cent of the total equity 
stakes of an enterprise in china, although it is normally considered to 
be 10 per cent or so in other countries (UNCTAD, 2005). In a sense, 
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therefore, the distinction between direct and indirect investment can 
be considered as a distinction between equity and non-equity 
investment. The distinction is critical, because it indicates a 
fundamentally different degree of resource involvement in the 
recipient country by the foreign investor. Once a decision has been 
made to invest in a foreign market, a question that immediately 
follows is whether to invest in a foreign market, a question that 
immediately follows is whether to invest in directly and own the 
production facilities in that country so as to acquire a lasting interest, 
or whether to make an indirect investment in that country in the form 
of licensing, franchising, processing, compensation trade or others. 
 
2.1.3 Main considerations for entry mode selection 
 
In the discussion, we use the hierarchical mode illustrate in figure 2-a 
as an analytical framework. We assume that there are different sets of 
factors determining entry mode selection at different levels of the 
hierarchy, and that managers should pay attention to the most 
relevant factors in their selection of entry modes at any given level of 
the hierarchy. Following this line of thinking, this part will discuss 
entry mode selection from high to low level of the hierarchy, mainly 
focus on 1.Exporting versus Investment, 2.Joint venture versus 
wholly foreign-owned enterprise, and illustrate the most crucial 
factors at each level of the hierarchy. In here, Dunnings eclectic 
model as the main framework of reference and classify all factors into 
three categories: location, ownership, and transaction cost, therefore, 
TNCs should take into consideration the most important factors in 
these categories in relation to the crucial differences between the 
entry modes under comparison at the same level. 
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2.1.3.1 Exporting versus Investment: 
 
The key difference between exporting and investment is that the 
former involves the short-term sale of goods produced outside china 
while the latter involves long-term investment in facilities that 
produces goods inside China. In choosing between exporting and 
investment, TNCs should, fist take into consideration location-specific 
factors. For example, China, has a large population and plentiful 
natural resource, hence, build the factor in China can access the 
resource and reduce the cost of produce, as well as access the largest 
potential market in the world. For TNCs, if it is cheaper to produce 
goods in China than in home country, it is in the interest of TNCs to 
make an investment in China to producing goods there rather than 
producing goods at home and then exporting them to China. For the 
TNCs from less developed countries, however, where the labor force is 
cheaper even than that in China, would find exporting to China more 
attractive than investing there. Except the factor of resource 
availability, another location-specific factor is country risk. If a 
country is considered to be a country with high risk, investing in this 
country would be less attractive than exporting. For example, less 
company is willing to invest in Afghanistan or Iraq now, because no 
one know whether their factories are bombed in one day. The political 
risk is also important, the easily changing policy during the political 
battle would influence the corporate strategy a lot. 
 
Transaction cost (Internalization advantage) is another key 
consideration at this level. Mostly, if a country places costly tariff and 
non-tariff trade barriers in the way of the products that a TNC 
produces and exports to this country, i.e. the transaction cost of 
exporting would be very high, therefore, the TNC would be more 
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willing to invest in this country so as to produce and sell the products 
there. Alternatively, if the tariff and non-tariff trade barriers are low, 
the TNC may find it attractive to produce goods at home and export 
them to this country. So a countrys policy may have the ability to 
affect the decision. China is good example, the high tariff and 
non-tariff barriers that China maintained in the 1980s and early 1990s 
played a key role in attracting foreign investment to the country.  
 
Relatively speaking, ownership considerations play a less important 
role in selecting entry modes at this level than location and 
transaction cost considerations. Nevertheless, ownership cannot be 
completely excluded here. If a TNC has very strong core 
competencies in its marketing network rather than in production, for 
instance, it may find that exporting is preferable to investment. On 
the other hand, if a TNC has its core competencies in production as 
opposed to its marketing network, it may find that investment is a 
better choice. 
 
2.1.3.2 Joint Venture versus Wholly foreign-owned enterprise (WFOE) 
 
The key difference between joint venture and a wholly foreign-owned 
enterprise is that the former involves a local partner while the latter 
does not. In choosing between two entry modes, therefore, it is 
crucial for TNCs to take transaction cost into consideration first. A 
local partner in host country normally has local knowledge and local 
network that may help TNCs reduce transaction cost when they 
venture into the host country market. On the other hand, conflicts 
between partners may occur due to the difference of management 
system, cultureetc. which increases transaction cost. Hence, the 
TNCs should think carefully about the advantage and disadvantage of 
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the joint venture option in terms of transaction cost. If the transaction 
cost of establishing and managing a joint venture is greater than 
establishing and managing a WFOE, it is in interest of a TNC to 
establish a WFOE to internalize its business activities. 
 
Ownership-specific factors should also be taken into consideration. It 
is very difficult for a TNC to protect its technology from leaking to a 
local partner in the setting of a joint venture. If a TNCs core 
technology is easily be copied by a local partner in a joint venture 
setting, therefore, it may find more beneficial to establish a WFOE 
than a joint venture. In China, many local companies have indeed 
successfully made use of joint ventures to learn about advanced 
technology and management know how from transnational 
corporations, such as Haier and TCL, have already managed to 
establish their own brand names, and begun to compete with their 
foreign counterparts in international markets. It is, therefore, quite 
reasonable that TNCs should now have become cautious about 
technology leaking in the setting of joint ventures. 
 
Moreover, location-specific factors such as country risk should be 
taken into consideration as well. In a joint venture, a TNC can share 
the costs and risks with a local Chinese partner. If the risks of 
investing in China are high, a TNC may find joint ventures preferable 
to WFOEs. If the risks are low, on the other hand, a TNC may find joint 
ventures less attractive, as it does not need a local partner to share 
the risks. The decline of Joint ventures reflects, in a sense, the 
perception that China is no longer a high-risk country. 
 
2.2 Entry strategy  
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2.2.1 Partner selection 
 
It is assumed that firms only alliance when the perceived additional 
benefits of exercising the alliance option outweigh its expected 
additional costs. One of the key notions in the international joint 
venture (IJV) is that these additional benefits will accrue only through 
the retention of a partner who can provide the four Cs: Compatible 
goals, complementary skills, cooperative culture, and commensurate 
risk (Luo, 2000). Partner selection determines an IJVs mix of skills, 
knowledge, and resources, its operating policies and procedures, and 
its vulnerability to indigenous conditions, structures, and institutional 
changes. In a dynamic, complex, or hostile environment, the 
importance of local partner selection to IJV success is magnified 
because the right partner can spur the IJVs adaptability, 
strategy-environment configuration, and uncertainty reduction. 
 
During the process of IJV formation, foreign parent firms must 
identify appropriate criteria for local partner selection as well as the 
relative importance of each criterion. They are divergent depending 
on firm, setting, and time. Broadly, the criteria can be classified into 
three categories related to 1. Tasks or operations 2. Partnership or 
cooperation 3. Cash flow or capital structure.  Conceptually, the 
selection criteria can be classified into strategic, organizational and 
financial fit three forms, Luo (2000) summarize these in Figure 2-b, 
such classification is imperative because each group affects a different 
kind of fit (strategic, organizational, and financial), thus influencing 
different dimensions of IJV performance. 
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Local partner
attributes 
Operation or 
task-related 
Cooperation or 
Partner-related
Cash 
flow-related 
Strategic attributes 
marketing competence 
relationship building 
technological skills 
industrial experience 
strategic orientation 
corporate image 
market power 
Organizational attributes 
organizational leadership 
previous collaboration 
ownership type  
Learning ability  
Foreign experience  
Human resource skills 
Financial attributes 
profitability  
Liquidity  
Leverage  
Asset efficiency 
Strategic Fit Organization 
Fit 
Financial Fit 
International Joint 
Venture Success 
Figure 2-b 
Source: Luo, 2000, Partnering with Chinese Firms, p.48 
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A partners strategic traits influence the operational skills and 
resources needed for the joint ventures competitive success, 
organizational traits affect the efficiency and effectiveness of 
inter-firm cooperation, and financial traits impact the optimization of 
capital structure and cash flow. A partner with superior strategic traits, 
but lacking strong organizational and financial characteristics, results 
in an unstable joint venture. The possession of desirable 
organizational attributes without corresponding strategic and 
financial competence leaves the joint venture unprofitable. A partner 
with superior financial strengths without strategic and organizational 
competencies can lead to an unsustainable venture 
 
In the selection process, international managers may use this scheme 
to examine the strengths and weaknesses of the potential partners 
and to determine whether partner attributes fit their own in strategic, 
organizational, and financial arenas. There is one additional point 
need to mention here, what the partner has like the core 
competencies, corporate image, and personal network would 
influence the performance of IJV in the same way as financial factor, 
thus, there is incentive to modify the financial fit criteria as capacity fit 
criteria which include financial strength as one factor. (Tian, 2007) 
 
2.2.1.1 Strategic fit 
 
To evaluate the strategic fit, it is necessary for the TNCs to assess the 
extent to which the strategic objectives of the partners are compatible 
and complementary. Clearly, a company forms an alliance with 
another company in order to achieve its strategic objectives, yet, 
more often than not, partners in an alliance have different strategic 
objectives, but still want to achieve their respective strategic 
 23
objectives through the alliance. Thus, in selecting a partner, a 
company can hardly expect that partner to have exactly the same 
strategic objectives as itself, but it can hope that the partners 
strategic objectives are different from, but compatible with and 
complementary to, its own. 
 
To know whether the strategic objectives of the partner are 
compatible and complementary, it is useful to assess the criticality of 
the alliance to the partners by asking two main questions: 1. how 
important is the alliance to the partner, and 2. will the partner depend 
on the alliance in order to achieve its own strategic objectives. 
Positive answers to these questions demonstrate that the alliance is 
important for the partner and that the commitment of the partner to 
the alliance is high, which often indicates a good strategic fit. In 
selecting a local partner, hence, a TNC need to know whether what it 
has is really what the partner needs and what his partner has is what 
he really wants. 
 
2.2.1.2 Capacity fit 
 
To assess the capacity fit, TNCs need to evaluate the extent to which 
the partners in the alliance will be capable of meeting each others 
needs, and capable of helping each other to reach their own targets. 
Although partners in an alliance may have what each other needs, the 
alliance may still fail if they do not have the capacity of making use of 
what they have to meet these needs and help each other achieve their 
objectives. The capacity is comprehensive and is related to a wide 
range of areas, only core competencies, corporate image, personal 
network and financial strength would be discussed in here. In 
selecting a local partner, its useful to ask whether that partner has the 
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capacity to help them achieve their strategic objectives through the 
alliance, and asses the capability of the partner in these areas in 
detail. 
 
Core competencies: It is essential to pay the attention on what the 
local partner has in key functional areas that will affect the ability of 
the TNC to achieve its strategic objectives through the alliances. For 
example whether the partner have the qualified human resources to 
undertake the kind of work required by the alliance, the capability of 
finding better local suppliers for the alliance, the capacity to promote 
the goods and services produced, the information have about the local 
market. 
 
Corporate image: Attention should be paid on whether the local 
partner enjoys a good reputation for its products, after-sales service, 
social responsibilities, etc. As mentioned by Luo (1998), for instance, 
Panda Electronics Group, the local partner of Philips, was very famous 
in China for producing high-quality products in electronics and for 
providing good customer service. The good corporate image of the 
local partner helped greatly to promote the electronics products that 
the alliances manufactured in China. 
 
Personal network: A TNC usually weak in the personal network when 
he firstly entry the country, hence, it is very important for them to 
select a local partner that has well-established network, not only with 
the people in the business world but also with officials in government. 
This kind of personal network (Guanxi) usually plays a vital role in the 
success of international business alliance in China. 
 
Financial strength: This is an important area to focus on is whether 
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the local partner has enough financial capacity to carry out the work 
needed by the alliance. In addition, poor financial resources often 
indicate weaknesses and shortcomings in major areas of the 
management in a company, which are also detrimental to an alliance. 
 
2.2.1.3 Organization fit 
 
To evaluate the organization fit, TNCs need to assess the extent to 
which the organizational attributes of the partner in the alliance are 
conducive to the operation of the alliance. For example the 
organization leadership, ownership type, learning abilities, foreign 
experience and human resources management skills of local partners. 
All these organizational attributes affect the partners capacity to 
meet the needs of the alliance, and thus have a significant impact on 
the performance of the alliance. Thus, while selecting the partner, it 
essential for the TNCs to ask themselves whether that partner will 
have organizational attributes that are conducive to the alliance and 
that can help achieve their strategic objectives through alliance. 
 
Organizational leadership: Berlew (1974, p.22) define that 
organizational leadership is the process of instilling in others shared 
vision, creating valued opportunities, and building confidence in the 
realization of the shared values and opportunities. As such, 
leadership is crucial to a business organization. Good leadership can 
provide the foresight and vision that guide the organization in the 
right business direction well before others, and thus enhance that 
organizations chances of success.  
 
Ownership structure: This is important, especially in China. Since the 
economic reform started in 1978, and has diversified subsequently. 
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There are many different forms of ownership in China today, but they 
can be roughly classified into three basic types: state-owned, 
collective-owned and privately owned. TNCs need to know the 
advantages and disadvantages of each of the ownership types, and 
look for a local partner with the ownership type that helps to achieve 
their strategic objectives. 
 
Learning ability: In a dynamic, complex or hostile environment, the 
learning ability is very important, because whether the local partner 
has the ability to learn how to adapt to the rapidly changing business 
environment would influence the success of the alliance. In an 
international business alliance, for instance, a local partner is 
supposed to acquire knowledge of advanced technology and 
management know-how from the foreign partner, and use the learnt 
knowledge in the day-to-day operation. To make an international 
alliance work, hence, it is crucial that the local partner has the ability 
to acquire, process, assimilate and integrate new knowledge and 
skills. 
 
Foreign experience: It is closely related to learning ability, foreign 
experience is also an important organizational attribute that may 
affect the performance of a local partner in an international business 
alliance. TNCs normally bring new business concept and management 
style to a host country, if the local partner has plentiful foreign 
experience, it may be able to communicate with the foreign partner in 
an international business alliance, and thus avoid unnecessary 
misunderstanding and conflicts within the alliance. 
 
Human resource management skills: It is crucial for the local partner 
to have the skills to manage the employees in a cross-cultural setting, 
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to collaborate with the foreign partner in managing human resources 
in the alliance. These skills cover a wide range of areas, such as 
recruiting and retaining valued employees, training and career 
development. Thus, in selecting local partner, TNCs need to ask 
themselves whether the local partner has the ability to manage 
employees in a cross-cultural environment. 
 
2.2.2 Control over alliances 
 
Partners in an international business alliance often have different 
strategic objectives, as discussed earlier, so each side tend to seek 
control over the alliance in order to run the alliance in a way that best 
serves its own interests. However, the poorly designed control 
structures often lead to conflicts between partners in an alliance, 
disappointing performances or even failure, thus, it is important to 
recognize that not always achievable, or even desirable to control 
over alliances (Tian, 2007) In theory, two factors are often crucial to 
determine whether a partner should take control the alliances, and 
they are the host country government regulations and the relative 
strength of the partners in the alliance. 
 
2.2.2.1 Host-country Regulations 
 
Governments in host countries, particularly host countries is the 
developing country, the government tend to worry about the possible 
loss of economic independence if foreign companies move in and gain 
control over these pillar industries in equity terms, and therefore they 
often set strict restrictions on equity-involved alliances in these 
industries. 
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The issue of foreign control over an alliance in equity terms is 
particularly sensitive in China, where the Communist Party has been 
in power for many years and is trying to pursue economic reform in 
such a way that economic development is achieved without 
jeopardizing the Partys control over the economy (Tian, 2007). As 
acquisitions and mergers are highly restricted in China, the issue of 
foreign equity control over an alliance relates mainly to alliances in 
the form of joint ventures. The government has set restrictions on 
foreign control over joint ventures ever since 1979 when the Law of 
the peoples republic of China on Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures 
was issued. In 1995 the Regulations on Guiding the Direction of 
Foreign Investment and the Guidance Catalog of Industries with 
Foreign Investment were issued, clearly specifying the industries in 
which foreign control over joint ventures through majority 
shareholding is not permitted. 
 
The Regulations and the Guidance Catalog divide all Chinese 
industries into four categories: Encouraged, Restricted, Prohibited 
and Permitted. In the category of Restricted industries, one of the 
restrictions is that TNCs have to enter these industries in the form of 
a joint venture with the Chinese party as the controlling shareholder 
or the Chinese party as the relatively controlling shareholder (Lo and 
Tian, 2005) That is to say, the foreign party can neither have more 
than 50 per cent of the equity share of the joint venture nor have an 
equity share that is higher than that which its Chinese partner has in 
the joint venture. However, along with the progress in economic 
liberalization and opening up, the government gradually relaxed its 
policy on TNCs in the restricted industries. 
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Control over an alliance, particularly an alliance in which equities are 
involved, is a very sensitive issue in a host country if the alliance 
happens to be in an industry that is considered to be of vital 
importance to the country-one of the so-called Pillar industries. The 
Automotive industry in China is one of the pillar industries, and then 
there are different regulations to restrict the foreigner to entry freely 
more about these policies are discussed in the Chapter 3- Policy 
analysis. 
 
2.2.2.2 The relative strength of partners in alliances 
 
Just as what we mentioned early, even the regulation is allowed to 
have the control, but gaining control of alliance is not always desirable.  
According to resource dependence theory of business organization, 
the ability of one party to command the key resources in an 
organization gives the party control over it (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978), thus, that is to say, the partner that commands the key 
resources alliance, while the partner that does not have the resources 
should not take control. 
 
Drawing on resource dependence theory, international business 
scholars break down not only control but also resources into different 
categories. It is argued that control can be classified in two categories: 
strategic control and operational control. Strategic control refers to 
control over the overall direction and operation of an alliance, 
including the appointment of board members and board chairman, 
and the command of key financial resources. In contrast, operational 
control refers to control over specific functional areas in the alliance, 
such as sourcing, product quality, promotion, distributionetc. 
Resources can be classified in two categories: equity resources and 
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non-equity resources. Equity resources refer to all kinds of tangible 
assets, including land, building and plants, cash, etc. Non-equity 
resources refer to a wide range of intangible assets, including 
management know-how, technology, local knowledge, sourcing 
networks and social connections (guanxi in the Chinese context). 
 
Child and Yan (2001) argued that equity shares in an alliance 
primarily determine the degree to which partners in the alliance to 
have the right to strategic control over the alliance, and non-equity 
resources in an alliance primarily determine the degree to which the 
partners have the right to operational control of the alliance. TNCs 
that seek strategic control of an alliance should obtain a majority 
equity share, while TNCs that seek operational control over an alliance 
should, first and foremost, provide the key non-equity resources for 
the functional areas that they wan to take control of. However, this 
model ignores one important issue-Key success resources (KSRs), 
that is the specific key resources needed for the success of an alliance. 
This issue is important, because these key resources are 
indispensable for the success of an alliance, and whoever has them 
should assume the strategic control of the alliance through a majority 
shareholding. Thus, other things being equal, whether or not a 
partner should take strategic control over an alliance depends upon 
the relative strength of the partner in provision of the KSRs for the 
alliance. If the KSRs are the proprietary technologies or global 
marketing networks in which a TNC has obvious strength, the TNC 
should seek strategic control of the alliance through a majority 
shareholding. If the key success resources are the local service 
support systems or local connections in which a local partner has 
obvious strength, on the other hand, it may not be in the interests of 
the TNC to seek strategic control of the alliance through majority 
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shareholding. If the TNC seeks strategic control despite its obvious 
weakness in providing the KSRs, the Chinese partner that commands 
the KSRs may be reluctant to collaborate with the TNC, which often 
results in disappointing performance, or even failure of the alliance. 
 
In sum, control over an alliance is a very important and complex issue. 
TNCs need to think carefully about the conditions under which control 
over the alliances is not only achievable but also desirable. That is, 
they need to examine minutely the current restrictions on foreign 
majority control of alliances in China, and assess realistically whether 
they command the key resources that are indispensable for the 
success of the alliance. 
 
2.2.3 Conflict management 
 
Conflicts often occur between partners in alliances, particularly in 
international business alliances, where the partners are from different 
countries and cultural backgrounds. Therefore, managing conflicts is 
a daunting task for the partners in international business alliances, 
and TNC need to pay particular attention to the major sources of 
conflicts, appropriate approaches to conflict resolution, and cultural 
differences between the partners. 
 
There are many factors that can lead to conflicts between partners, 
but three in particular stand out. To begin with, conflicts may be 
related to problems to do with the partner per se. Partner-related 
conflicts often occur when a TNC selects an unfit partner with 
strategic objectives that are in contradiction with those of the TNC, 
with and organizational structure that is not conducive to the 
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functioning of the alliance or without the capacity to fulfil its 
commitments to the alliance. In addition, conflicts may be related to 
cultural differences within an international business alliance. Cultural 
differences may lead to misunderstandings and divisions between the 
personnel of the two partners, and thus result in conflicts between 
different groups of people within the alliance. Cultural related conflicts 
may occur regardless of whether a TNC has selected a fit local 
partner in terms of strategic objectives, organizational structure and 
capacity. This kind of conflict may occur, moreover, regardless of 
whether a TNC has made an appropriate control structure 
arrangement for the alliance. Furthermore, conflicts may be related to 
the environment in which an alliance is located. For example, since 
1978 China has been undergoing a transition form a command 
economy to a market-based economy, and has witnessed profound 
changes in social and political systems in this process. The transition 
will inevitably be a prolonged process because of the complexities that 
China has inherited from the past, and in the interim the business 
environment is full of irregularities, which puzzles business people 
form other parts of the world and can lead to conflicts within an 
international business alliance. (Tian, 2007) 
 
No matter what the roots of such conflicts are, TNCs need to take the 
appropriate measures to resolve them. In the literature on managing 
conflicts of these types many resolution strategies have been 
proposed, four of which are the most important ones: 1.a 
problem-solving strategy 2.a compromising strategy 3.a forcing 
strategy and 4.a legalistic strategy. In fact, the four strategies can be 
grouped into two broad approaches to conflict resolution: soft-line 
approaches and hard-line approaches. Under a soft-line approach, a 
partner takes into account what the other partner thinks and feels, 
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and resolves conflicts through compromises, open and friendly 
negotiations, and reasoned argument and persuasion. This approach 
roughly corresponds to the problem-solving strategy and the 
compromising strategy. Under the hard-line approach, one partner 
imposes its will on the other party, sometimes by having recourse to 
the law, and resolves conflicts through non-compromising 
confrontation. This approach roughly corresponds to the forcing 
strategy and the legalistic strategy. Lin & Germain (1998) find that the 
more similar the partners are in cultural traditions the more likely they 
are to adopt a soft-line approach. For example, TNCs form Singapore 
and Hong Kong are more likely to adopt a soft-line approach in China 
than TNCs from western countries. In addition, the evidence from 
them also show that the greater power and strength a partner has in 
the relationship the more likely that partner is to adopt a hard-line 
approach, the more key resources a TNC holds the more likely to put 
pressure on the Chinese partners through legal channels. Except what 
these finds show, the choice of conflict solution depends primarily on 
the root cause of the conflict: if the fundamental problem is a lack of 
willingness or ability on the part of the Chinese partner to fulfill its 
commitments to the alliance, for example, the adoption of a soft-line 
approach may not lead to a result in the best interests of the TNC, and 
adopting a hard-line approach may be the best option. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
This chapter is going to answer the question of what research 
method has been applied on this research?; where the data from? 
and indicate the limitation of this research.  
 
3.1 Qualitative Research Method 
 
Qualitative methods are generally considered capable to present 
richer and softer data, compared with quantitative research methods 
(Silverman, 2000). However, the reliability and validity of qualitative 
methods have always been questioned; more specifically, the 
subjectivity of qualitative research seems to be the main cause of the 
above problem. 
 
Objectivity is the basic criterion of any social science research. 
Subjectivity is unavoidable in all kinds of research methods 
(Silverman, 2000). Therefore, qualitative research should be 
conducted under several guidelines as to obtain the rigor, such as 
systematic data collection, record-keeping and data analysis 
(Silverman, 2000), and the most important rule is never treat a 
participants opinion or a single aspect as an explanation of the 
phenomenon that is being studied (Silverman, 2000) 
 
According to Banister et al. (1994, p.2), qualitative research is the 
interpretative study of a specific issue or problem in which the 
researcher is central to the sense that is made, qualitative research is 
not only closely linked with social, cultural and historical context 
(Halloran, 1998), but a kind of crafting that reflects the researchers 
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aim and style (Watson, 1994). 
 
Research method is a tool for the researcher to conduct the research, 
which method to be used should depend on the research context, that 
is, depend on the research problems and study objects. In this 
dissertation, since the objective is to try to understand whether the 
limitation of host country regulations would finally lead the failure of 
international joint venture, and how does strategies play an important 
role in the success of international joint venture, the qualitative 
method is able to play an important role to serve this purpose due to 
its grounded, discovery-oriented, explanatory, expansionist, 
descriptive and inductive features (Deshpande, 1983). 
 
3.2 Case Study Approach 
 
The Strengths of case studies have been explored by many 
researchers. Merriam (1988) concluded that the case studies have an 
advantage in resulting a rich, thick description and analysis of a 
phenomenon which may be desired. Jankowicz (1995) thought that 
the case studies facilitate intimate knowledge of the sample group, 
their thoughts, feelings and actions by experiencing their 
environment which gives depths to the study from a limited number of 
subjects, and suggested the case study method is appropriate where 
the research design focuses on a set of issues within one organization, 
this paper is going to explore the entry strategy in two joint ventures 
and which fully meet suggestion of Jankowicz. Yin (1994) argued that 
the case study approach method is appropriate in understanding 
complex phenomenon in a real-life context by answering how and 
why questions, he also agreed that case study can more effectively 
analyze causation than quantitative cross-sectional research. 
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Therefore, it is helpful in understanding the strategic issues in 
operating a successful JV in Chinas automotive industry. 
 
Compared to the single case study, multiple-case studies is 
considered to have clear advantages over single-case design in the 
evidence of multiple-cases shows more comprehensive and robust 
(Herriott, Firestond, 1983), and it further lead to enhance 
generalizability and deepen understanding and explanation (Miles, 
Huberman, 1994). The logic underlying the use of multi-case studies 
is: each case selected must be either (a) predicts similar results or (b) 
predicts contrasting results but fro predictable reasons (Yin, 2003). 
Therefore, this can explain why this paper is going to apply the 
multi-case studies, why it chooses Shanghai Volkswagen and 
Guangzhou Peugeot as the research objectives, because both of two 
foreign companies came to China in 1980s to form a joint venture with 
one local partner but they have a completely different performance. 
 
3.3 Secondary Data 
 
Secondary data is very important to the research (Chisnall, 1991) and 
has been adopted as the research method in this research. Secondary 
data is the data that have already been published by or are available 
from existing resource. Hyman (1987) takes the view that when 
researching on contemporary issues, the secondary data covers a 
wide range of material related various areas and perspectives, as 
result, it can assist in generate a more comprehensive and depth 
scope than the sing perspective of primary data. The secondary date 
employed in this study is collected from various resources. Previous 
literatures access through public and university libraries and website 
in the form of articles, journals and textbooks. The more specific 
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industry information has been collected through government 
publications, official reports, and business news. Companys annual 
report, business analysis, and case studies of the previous literatures 
contributed a lot to the specific information about the company. 
Besides data explored above, various other secondary data has been 
available through the internet, the official press release from 
companys official websites, as well as newspaper, which are likely to 
provide more up-to-date information. All these valuable secondary 
data provide a genuine and deep understanding of the research 
context and studying subjects. 
 
An important reason for using secondary data is the difficult to access 
first-hand data. The research objective of this paper is the policies, 
the joint ventures, as a normal Master student, it is difficult to directly 
access the information from government department, government 
website is the only channel to get the detail of these regulations. And 
one case study objective in this paper is Guangzhou Peugeot Co., 
which have not exist since 1997, so it becomes more difficult to access 
the first-hand data, secondary data from others article is the only 
channel to get information about this company. 
 
3.4 Limitations 
 
The first problem is the limitation of data collection. The secondary 
data available is limited; mainly the public ones, may be some really 
valuable data related to research are unknown to the research or 
inaccessible. A second problem is there is potential fro research bias 
when using the case study method, although the case study enables a 
more comprehensive review and analysis of a single situation than 
other methods (Jankowicz, 1995). Try to illustrate the whole industry 
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with the information focus on only three companies may be biased. 
Third, some data may be due to the information constraints although 
the researcher tried to get the latest ones. And finally, as this research 
is based on qualitative research method, which is often complaint by 
anecdotalism that questions the researchs validity. According to 
Bryman (1998, p.77), there is a tendency towards an anecdotal 
approach to the use of data in relation to conclusion or explanations in 
qualitative research.. There are grounds for disquiet in that the 
representativeness or generality of these fragments is rarely 
addressed. While Silverman (2000) also argued that qualitative 
research is easy to be lack of reliability. 
 
Despite these limitations, the researcher believes that the chosen 
research method is an appropriate method of the study considering 
the aim and objectives of the research subject. 
 
 
 40
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part ċ 
 41
Chapter 4: Research context 
 
Economic factors about Chinas passenger car market, governments 
expectation on automotive industry development and governments 
regulation on automotive industry are the three main factors going to 
be pointed out in this chapter, the analysis of these three factors will 
provide an description of the research background, and answer the 
questions of why foreign funds like to invest in Chinas passenger car 
industry?; and which regulation will be strategic /barrier for their 
entry? 
 
4.1 Economic factors about the passenger car market in China 
 
Why TNCs like to entry? A simple answer to this question is that 
because they except the entry will bring themselves profits now or in 
the future, most of them come to China because of the location 
advantages. The location advantages mainly reflect on two aspects: 
the huge domestic market in China and Foreign companies are 
superior to domestic manufacturers on technology, management and 
marketing aspects. 
 
4.1.1 Huge domestic market 
 
"China offers the greatest potential market in the world and that's 
why everyone is coming -Nissan's contact person in China, (China 
daily, 11/14/94, 2) 
 
In 1949-1979, although the domestic vehicle plants had technologies 
to produce cars, they mainly produced trucks and buses for 
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transportation, tractors fro agriculture, and jeeps for the military. As 
private cars were regarded as luxury goods, they were not produced 
or imported for the general public (Qiu, 2005). Thus, after China 
opened to the world, TNCs like to enter quickly to occupy the 
passenger car market and win a first move advantage. Chinas 
passenger car market is blank at the beginning of 1980s, any firm like 
to entry would expect the success of entry bring it a new opportunity 
to growth. Income, one important factor that affects the demand for 
automobiles in China, will be discussed. Reviewing of the historical 
data of income would prove that China does have a location 
advantage if the foreign companies can have a right forecast of the 
growth of the automobile market. 
 
While making the entry decision, it is necessary to take the 
location-specific factors into account first. China has an obvious 
advantage in its cheap labor force and the largest potential market in 
the world. The central intelligence Agency issued a report in 
December 2004, it stated that by 2020 the worlds geopolitical center 
of gravity will tilt toward Asia, especially China, the economy of which 
will have surpassed Japans to become second only to that of the U.S. 
(Qiu, 2005). Another study show that the motorization rate in China 
has increased from 1.70 vehicles per 1000 people in 1980 to 9.37 
vehicles per 1000 people in 1996 and predict that Chinas 
motorization rate would grow to 54 vehicles per 1000 people by 2020 
(Riley, 2002). Undoubtedly, the demand for automobiles remains 
strong in the long run. 
 
Income is the major factor in affecting the demand for sedans, and 
the whole countrys economic activities affect demand for all types of 
motor vehicles. Table 4-1 (Qiu, 2005, p.15) shows that China had the 
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highest GDP growth rate compare to other countries or regions in East 
Asia. An increase in national income implies a rise in living standards 
and purchasing power, which should generate robust demand for 
automobiles. 
 
 
 
Personal income is a more specific factor in affecting the demand for 
private cars (passenger car) than a countrys total GDP level and 
growth. Table 4-2 (Qiu,2005, p.16) shows a three-year time data 
series, the correlation between per capital GDP and sales of motor 
vehicles is 0.96 and the correlation between per capital GDP and sales 
of sedans is 0.94. This indicates a strong positive correlation between 
the demand for automobiles and personal income. Note in 2002 
Chinas per capital GDP was still below US$1,000, and experience 
shows that there will be a big boost in automobile demand once a 
countrys per capital income reaches US$3,000, but because China 
has a huge population and the income inequality is large, we do not 
have to wait until China reaches this common critical income level to 
see robust demand for automobiles (Qiu, 2005). 
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However, the per capital GDP of China increased from 460 Yuan in 
1980 to 8184 Yuan in 2002, with an annual growth rate of 25% on 
average, the demand for automobiles increases together with 
economic growth as peoples purchasing power increases over time 
and more and more people jump from the necessity-consumption 
group to the luxury-good-consumption group. They purchase cars for 
business or private use. At the same time, as a result of high economic 
growth, the society has more money to develop and improve its 
transport network and road infrastructure such as highways. 
Therefore, demand for automobiles is further boosted. The effects of 
economic growth on automobile demand can be seen clearly in figure 
4-1 (Qiu, 2005, p.17), which depicts the following three indices with 
1991 as the base year: per capita GDP, total motor vehicle sales and 
total sedan sales. It is clear that the income effect on sedan demand 
is stronger than that on all motor vehicle demand. This graph may 
serve as a base for forecasting future demand for automobiles in 
China once we have the forecast for GDP growth. (Qiu, 2005) 
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4.1.2 Competitive advantage in Infant Industry 
 
Before 1980s, there are not so such experience for the domestic auto 
maker on making passenger cars. Even Chinas automobile industry 
ranked the ninth in the world in 1999, a big gap still exist between 
China and world leading countries in terms of production, productivity, 
sales and R&D investment.(Qiu, 2005) Therefore, any TNCs from 
leading countries like Germany, Japan, U.S.A., and France have the 
obvious advantage on technology, marketing, quality 
managementetc, which are accumulated from their long history on 
manufacturing, are easy to win a share of the market if there are no 
other force (government) to intervene. Both two main strategy 
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positions are suitable for the TNCs: 1. Cost advantage: produce the 
product more efficiently than domestic manufacturer, because TNCs 
has more efficient production procedure, advanced technology. 2 
differentiation advantage: produce the product which is different from 
better than the domestic manufacturers, because TNCs have the 
newest design and most advanced technology. 
 
4.1.3 Summarize 
 
The weak competitive ability of the domestic manufacturer make the 
TNCs easily reduce the barrier of entry and find their competitive 
positions in Chinas infant auto industry, plus that the huge potential 
domestic market in China, most TNCs would think the success entry 
would bring them a new growth in East-Asian region, and from the 
point of global strategy view, success entry and win the first mover 
advantage would provide them more spare space to compete with 
their global competitors. 
 
4.2 Chinas Expectations on Automotive Industry 
Development 
 
Chinas open policy began in 1978, and it was same as the policy of 
the other developing countries, whose purpose was to supplement the 
shortage of domestic saving and take in technology and management 
know how from more advanced foreign countries. In the passenger 
car field, China has had taken the same policy as other developing 
countries which was basically an import substitution of finished 
products, then in accumulating ability in R&D, and finally in 
developing independently. During this process, China expected 
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foreign enterprises to first transfer technology through semi knock 
down (SKD) and then through complete knock down (CKD) (Lee, et 
al.). Then China hoped to develop a parts industry and finally 
cooperate in independent development through introducing 
technology for both production and development. 
 
What the Chinese government trying to do is to foster its own 
automotive industry and is not interested in turning China into an 
expansion base for European, American and Japanese auto industries. 
This intention of the Chinese government is made clear by the fact 
that foreign companies are not allowed to have majority (over 50 
percent) share holdings in joint venture projects for the production of 
finished vehicles. In other words, business in China for foreign auto 
manufacturers means they will never have more than the role of 
assistance provider and are strictly limited to helping the Chinese auto 
industry to develop independently (Lee, et al.), this is the basic 
attitude and expectation of the government on the development of 
automotive industry 
 
4.3 Related regulations and policies on the foreign entry 
 
In the below sections, more policies which related to foreign funding 
enter China automobile industry will be discussed, and the related 
policies will be classified into two categories, (a).Regulations and 
Policies related to Exporting V.S. Investment and (b) Regulations and 
Policies related to Joint venture V.S. Wholly foreign-owned 
enterprises. 
 
4.3.1 Regulations and Policies related to Exporting V.S. Investment 
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Refer to the literature review in chapter 2, it is necessary to consider 
the factor of transaction cost while making the entry choice, 
importantly, this is the factor which affect mostly by government 
policies. Chinas automobile was far behind the advanced countries in 
the late 1980s and 1990s. It is clearly an infant industry. There is no 
doubt that given the large technology gap, without import protections, 
foreign entries will easily wipe out the domestic player. As to protect 
this infant cars making industry and develop it into an internationally 
competitive one, the State Planning Commission (SPC) announced 
the Industrial policy for the Automotive Industry on 19 February, 1994. 
This policy was issued based on Korean Industrial policy in 1970s, 
which aimed to attract foreign direct investments, technology and 
management to modernize its less developed automotive industry 
(Wang, 2001).  
 
The Automotive Industry Policy mainly contains three important 
elements that have significant impact on foreign direct investment. 
 
4.3.1.1 Industry Development Control 
 
The automotive industry policy controls the industry development by 
requiring automakers to manufacture products within a list of 
approved product mixes that the government has shown that 
interests. Authentication of the product is issued by only producing 
product within the list of product category. Authentication is very 
important for the automakers, since they need the authentication 
before their products could be sold in the market legally. Only 
authenticated products can enter into the nationwide catalogue which 
is used by public security bureaus to issue licenses for motor vehicles 
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(Nee, 2002). Therefore, through the product development control, 
the government guides the industry to focus on certain product mixes 
deemed critical by the central government, preventing automotive 
enterprises from developing other things less desired by the 
government. 
 
4.3.1.2 Foreign Direct Investment Screening and Approval 
 
All foreign direct investment must be screened and approved by the 
government; they must fulfill the requirement of the automotive 
industry policy regarding foreign direct investment. For the foreign 
investors who want to set up JV with local automakers, they must 
have: (Source: Chinas Formal Policy on Development of Automotive 
Industry, Chapter 6, Clause No. 28) 
 
zGlobal product patents and trademarks 
zSophisticated product development and manufacturing 
technology  
zIndependent world wide sales and distributions 
zStrong and well developed financial capabilities 
 
And the policy also laid out some requirements for the JV formation: 
(Sources: Chinas Formal Policy on Development of Automotive 
Industry, Chapter 6, Clause No. 31 and 32) 
 
zSet up a research and development (R&D) centre in China 
zProducts must confirm to the international technical and quality 
standards 
zBe able to balance their foreign exchange independently under the 
foreign exchange control system in China 
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zChinese partners must have more than or equal to 50% of the 
shares of the JV 
zPreferential status must be given to the local parts and 
components manufacturers 
zTechnology must be transferred to the JV for product development  
zOnly JV product can be exported to foreign markets 
 
4.3.1.3 Import control 
 
In order to develop the domestic motor vehicle industry and 
encourage technology transfer, the Chinese government imposed 
strict licensing requirements and heavy tariffs on imported vehicles. 
High import tariff is imposed on all the imports, such as cars, auto 
parts and components, the import tariff may be 100% higher than the 
original value (Table 4-3). And only four seaports were allowed to 
import foreign cars, they were Dalian, Tianjin, Shanghai and Huangpu. 
All imported car must pay custom duties on top of the high import 
tariff. Despite the tariff, the government also set a quota of imported 
vehicles every year, this ensured the local automotive industry well 
protected. The procedures for importing foreign vehicles are 
complicated as well, the imported vehicles have to be inspected for 
quality, if they can meet the quality standard, and inspection and 
Quarantine Certificate for Entering Commodities and Car Attaching 
Inspecting Certificate will be issued. However, the process of 
inspection and issuing of certificates may take a long time, and this 
resulted an unpredictable lead time. 
 
 
Table 4-3: Several important Tariff rate changes for imported cars 
From 1980s to the early of 2000s Source: China Xinhua News (2006) 
 51
 
Tariff rate the car engine's capacity 
lower than 3 liter 
the car engine's capacity 
higher than 3 liter 
1986 180% 220% 
1994 110% 150% 
1997 80% 100% 
2001 70% 80% 
2002 43.8% 50.7% 
 
The import control is not only on complete car import, but also on auto 
parts, the policy laid out the local content requirement for the 
automotive JVs. The local content and technology transfer 
requirements are imposed to pursue two of its most important policy 
goals: a complex industrial development and self-reliance (Wang, 
2001).The import tariff of foreign vehicles, auto parts and 
components were determined by the percentage of local content of 
the goods. If the imported goods have a high percentage of local 
content value, a lower tariff would be imposed, vice versa. And the 
import tariff was further increased in 1997. The following Table 4-4 
shows the new tariff rates in 1997.  
 
Table 4-4 Local Content and Import Tariff  
 
Local Content Tariff for Imported 
components 
Above 80% 40% 
60%-80% 60% 
Below 60% 75% 
Source: Import vehicle market handbook, Beijing Transportation 
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Press 1997  
 
4.3.1.4 The significant Impact of this policy 
 
One of the significant impacts of this policy was the reliance of foreign 
investors on its local JV partners. The Automotive Industry Policy was 
not incorporated into law, it just used as an internal code for practice 
in selecting JV partners and setting up JVs. Since it did not instituted 
into law, foreign investors would not know about the detailed 
requirements and issues of setting up JVs in China, this made them 
heavily rely on their local China partners who have a more clear 
understanding regarding these issues. For example, General Motors 
did not have much information about how the customs would apply 
the local content rules on tariff for imported auto parts and 
components when it was considering setting up a JV in Shanghai. Its 
only source was its local partner, SAIC, which had experience in 
importing foreign auto parts into China and was probably involved in 
the policy making process of Automotive industry policy (Nee, 2002). 
This is one of the reasons the foreign investors need to seek for a local 
China partner when they entering Chinas automotive market through 
investment form, and whether able to cooperate with different 
cultural background partner should be one consideration of them, 
mostly, the inefficient and misunderstanding communication would 
lead the failure of the international alliances. 
 
4.3.2 Regulations and Policies related to Joint venture V.S. Wholly 
foreign-owned enterprises 
 
While making the Choice between the Joint venture and WFOE, the 
literature review in Chapter 2 states that it is crucial for TNCs to take 
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transaction cost into consideration first. In most cases, the TNC from 
foreign countries would bring a new management style and culture 
background, all these difference between the TNCs and its Chinese 
local partner would easily lead the misunderstanding and division 
between the personnel of the two partners, hence, WFOE may be a 
better Choice compare to Joint venture. There are some important 
policies which limits the choice to TNCs while they making this 
decision. 
 
4.3.2.1 Guidance of Foreign investment industries 
 
The Catalogue for Guidance of Foreign investment industries has one 
article clearly state that: 
 
Notes for Catalogue of Encouraged Industries: 
 
5. Manufacturing of automobile and motorcycle: the proportion of 
foreign investments shall not exceed 50% -Catalogue for the 
Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries (Attachment) 1 
 
This article which states that TNC can only invest in China auto 
industry through the form of Joint Venture and they can only hold 
maximum 50% shares of the Joint venture, this is due to China 
government want to control over the pillar industries and to benefit 
from FDI technology transfer. 
 
The article limit the Choice to the TNC, but its impossible to say that 
this is a bad thing, because Joint venture also has its advantages while 
TNCs enter China. As what mentioned above, A Chinese partner 
                                                        
1 Source: CHINAdaily, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2006-04/20/content_572219.htm  
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normally has local knowledge and a local connection (Guanxi in 
Chinese context) that may help TNCs reduce transaction cost when 
they venture into the Chinese market. Furthermore, its necessary to 
remember that the article state that Auto industry is one of 
Encouraged Industries, so it can also benefit from the encouraged 
industry policy. In the Regulation on Guiding the Direction of Foreign 
Investment, the Chinese government clearly defines the three 
categories of foreign investment projects. There are encouraged, 
restricted and prohibited three categories. And all the encouraged 
projects enjoy the preferential tax treatment given by the relevant 
laws and administrative regulations. (Appendix I) 
 
4.3.2.2 Pillar industry policy 
 
Furthermore, the 15th Plenary Session of the Central Committee of 
Central Communist Party clearly placed automotive industry as one of 
the important pillar industries of the national economy in 1987. This 
policy clearly stated out the strong supports of the Chinese 
government to develop the automotive industry. The central 
government had funded USD60 billion to those pillars industries 
including electronic, automotive and construction materials (BXA, 
1998). As being one of the pillar industries, automotive industry has 
received lots of funding, assistance and supports from the 
government, such as access to capital and priority approval in forming 
JVs. The Chinese government has played an important role in helping 
the local automakers to attract, negotiate and select foreign partners 
for forming JVs. 
 
Except the pillar industry policy, there are more articles that related to 
auto industry investment (Refer to Appendix II), they also state that 
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government would like to provide a lot of favorite policies to the TNC 
who can bring their new technology, management system. For the 
local government, they also like to give a favor policy to its favorite 
firms; for example, Shanghai municipal government once required 
that every city taxi be Shanghai-VWs Santana model. It will levies in 
its suburban areas. (Sit and Liu, 2000) 
 
4.3.2.3 The significant Impact of these policies 
 
Chinas policy strictly restricted the choice of TNC, Joint venture will 
be the only form of FDI they can choose to entry, but while 
government close the door to the TNC, they also open the window to 
the TNC, because forming the joint venture with the local partner in 
China, they can access the resources which his partner has e.g. the 
knowledge of the local market, Guanxietc. as well as they can 
benefit a lot from the favorite policies, whatever the centre or local 
government would like to provide a lot to support the advanced 
technology transfer to China. Qiu (2005) indicated that Local 
producers did not worry too much about pure domestic entrants 
because they would not be genuine competitors. Neither were local 
producers afraid of pure foreign automakers from imports since 
imports were heavily restricted. However, they faced serious entry 
threats from FDI. Due to the joint venture restrictions, local firms 
were competing in forming joint ventures with foreign partners. This 
unique characteristic of the market environment gives the local 
industry a dilemma: they dont like new entrants, but they are in a 
hurry to find foreign partners to come in the market. Thus, under this 
situation, TNC mostly have strong bargaining power with his local 
partner or government. 
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Chapter 5 Case study- Shanghai Volkswagen 
Automotive Company Ltd. (SVW) 
 
5.1 Company background: 
 
Shanghai Volkswagen is one of the largest single foreign-invested 
projects ever conceived in China and has proven to be a successful 
development. Compared with Beijing Jeep and Guangzhou Peugeots 
course, the German ventures progress was steady and smooth. In 
1997 Shanghai Volkswagen headed the list of the top 500 
foreign-funded enterprises operating in China. (Luo, 2001) 
 
VW had started to negotiate a major project for the annual production 
of 150,000 vehicles in China in 1978, when China announced its 
reforms and the open door policy. By 1981 the Chinese government 
had approved a smaller project with annual production of 20,000 units, 
and by 1985, approximately 1,000 Santana models had been 
assembled from completely knocked down (CKD) kits. Finally, in the 
spring of 1985 the Shanghai Volkswagen Automotive company limited 
(SVW) was established (refer to Table 5.1) (Boyer, et al., 1998) 
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By establishing SVW in the mid-1980s, Volkswagen sought to open up 
the Chinese market and in the medium term to develop a useful 
toehold for exports to South East Asia. Because in 1983, Volkswagen 
attempted to collaborate with Nissan to produce the Santana model in 
Japan had been less successful. At the time, the Chinese government 
saw modernizing the production of passenger cars as one of the main 
bulwarks of economic modernization. The government believed that 
Volkswagen was more willing than other firms to transfer modern 
technology, management and training methods to China. (Boyer, et al., 
1998; Luo, 2001) 
 
5.2 Partner Selection  
 
Volkswagen established its joint venture in Shanghai in 1985 namely 
Shanghai Volkswagen. The new joint venture was owned 50 per cent 
by Volkswagen, 25 per cent by the Shanghai Automotive Industrial 
Corporation (SAIC), 15 per cent by the bank of Chinas Shanghai Trust 
1978-85 Negotiations between VW and Chinese authorities 
March 1985  Founding of Shanghai Volkswagen Automotive Company Limited 
1985-90      Construction state: April 1990 production capacity of 60,000 finished
vehicles and 150,000 engines per year 
1989-90 Difficulties owing to Chinas domestic political environment 
1990-96 Further construction 
1993 Production capacity 100,000 units 
1995         Production capacity 160,000 units 
1996         production capacity 220,000 units 
1997        production capacity 300,000 units (117,000 Santana; 3,000 Santana
Variant; and 180,000 Santana 2000) 
Table 5.1 the Development of SVW 
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and Consultancy Corporation, and 10 per cent by China National 
Automotive Industry Corporation (CNAIC). The diversity of partners 
revealed careful forethought: the Bank of China could provide or 
guarantee needed loans, SAIC would have an interest in solving local 
problems, and CNAIC could be a link to the central government 
(Harwit, 1992). 
 
5.2.1 Strategic fit 
 
Volkswagen has an aim as part of its global competition strategy to 
build up a business base in the Far East that will limit the dominance 
of Japanese firms. Its strategy is for China to become a big export 
base for the whole of Southeast Asia (Luo, 2001). On the other side, 
Shanghai government has an aim to take in technology and 
management know how from more advanced foreign countries, as 
well as encourage the related industries to develop. Although the two 
sides had different motives for forming the joint venture, both 
realized that the increase in production domestication could help 
them reach their respective goals. 
 
5.2.2 Capacity fit 
 
Shanghai can be seemed as a home for heavy industry, it has one 
biggest steel plant- Baosteel Group Co., and its neighbor 
province-Jiangsu has a large number of factories, thus local in 
Shanghai is a not bad Choice. But in 1980s, the industrial 
infrastructure in the automobile industry was poor, and imported 
components faced high import tariffs of 25 to 40 percent. The 
technical standards of Chinese automobile-component suppliers in 
1986 were nearly thirty years behind component manufacturers of 
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Europe, Japan and U.S. Local government and Volkswagen both work 
together to develop the auto parts industry. During the the Ninth five 
year plan, the auto parts industry policy indicated that the 
government gives first preferences to 25 kinds of key project in 
passenger car parts production through a low interest fund. The 
government reduces or exempts from investment tax and promotes 
introduction of foreign capital to the above parts makers (Leeet al) 
For the Volkswagen, the development of local capabilities was 
incredibly important to their ability to compete in the market, in order 
to improve the capabilities, Volkswagen worked with their European 
parts manufacturers to encourage their entry into China. 
Volkswagens technical staff supported them by assisting with the 
identification of possible Chinese partners for the various parts to be 
manufactured (Luo, 2001) 
 
Therefore, Volkswagen enter China face a same problem as his 
competitor- the poor infrastructure, but it recognize the importance of 
local capabilities, and have a good corporation with the government, 
they are on a right way to the future. 
 
5.2.3 Organization fit 
 
SAIC is the largest auto manufacturer in china in 1980s, it is a 
stated-owned company, it has no previous experience to corporate 
with foreign companies before alliance with Volkswagen, China has 
implemented the closed doorism policy from 1949 to Deng Xiaopings 
open door came out in 1978, hence, there was not big difference 
between the domestic auto manufacturers in 1980s, they were all 
stated-owned, had no previous foreign experience and all human 
management system seemed in the same form. 
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5.2.4 Summarize 
 
Organization fit does not seem as an important criterion in partner 
selection in 1980s because all domestic partners in China do not have 
big difference at that moment. strategic and capability fit were more 
important, Volkswagen made a good selection base on these two 
criteria to alliance with the SAIC and built its plant in Shanghai- the 
most developed industrial area in China. Volkswagen and SAIC have 
the compatible and complement objectives, to develop the auto 
industry and occupy the market. Volkswagen also recognize the 
importance of local capability development, it can not grow without 
the development of its related supplier. 
 
5.3 Control over alliances 
 
5.3.1 Host-country (China) regulations: 
 
Refer to Section 4.3.2, the regulation of catalogue for guidance of 
foreign investment industries and the pillar industry policy have 
clearly stated that Automotive industry is one of the pillar industry in 
China, and the proportion of foreign investments in Manufacturing of 
automobile and motorcycle shall not exceed 50%. Therefore, foreign 
companies would not be able to obtain more control over the alliance 
through holding higher percentage of shares (>50%). 
 
SVW, capital investment was contributed on an equal basis by Chinese 
partners (mainly SAIC) and Volkswagen A.G. The equal membership 
on both board of directors and the executive management committee 
allows the Chinese side to hold the positions of president and 
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Managing Director, while the German side to hold the other two 
important positions of Commercial Executive Director and Technical 
Executive Director. Power of control seems equally distribute between 
two sides of China and Volkswagen. 
 
5.3.2 The relative strength of partners in SVW 
 
Tian (2007) mentioned that whether or not a partner in an alliance 
should take control depends upon many factors, but two of them are 
crucial: the host country government regulations and the relative 
strength of the partners in the alliance. Regulations restriction 
normally are not allowed to be changed, what the TNCs can do is to 
gain control on the side they are good at, and not seek to control what 
they are not good at. Leeet al indicated that the cooperation 
between central and local governments and the maker, Shanghai-VW, 
were an important factor in success. SVW has a very good distribution 
of control, the local partner have the specific local information, and 
one most important thing is it has Guanxi, has a good Guanxi with the 
government, the joint venture would benefit more from the policy 
support, For example, in 1988, The mayor Zhu Rongji, took several 
steps to aid SVW, including encouraging the development of a 
municipal taxi company that exclusively used the joint-venture cars 
(Harwit, 1992). On the other side, Volkswagen has better knowledge 
on the Marketing and Technology development, and then the 
representative would in charge these two departments. 
 
5.4 Conflict management: 
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This section is going to illustrate the relationship between partners 
and have an introduction of the conflict management system in SVW. 
5.4.1 Good relation with government, good policy treatment 
The accomplishments of Shanghai-VW have been achieved with the 
support of the Chinese central government, which determined the 
companys pioneer status in the automobile industry (Lee, et al.). 
The government not only offered SVW preferential advantages in 
taxes, but also provided convenience in foreign currency and material 
supply in the early period. In the meantime, the Shanghai Municipal 
Government has ranked the automotive industry as the first 
important industry, and supported SVW. The cooperation between 
central and local governments and the maker, SVW, were an 
important factor in its success.  
Some special treatments to SVW 
1. As mentioned, the Germans were to import Santana Kits, and 
localize parts production over the first few years of the venture. A 
key element of the agreement, moreover, was that VW would be 
allowed to exchange its RMB profits for hard currency, at the 
official exchange rate, until 89,000 cars were produced. (Harwit, 
1992, p.153) 
2. In 1988 the Chinese central government approved a domestication 
tax levied on the sale of cars made by SVW (28,000 Yuan [about 
US $3,400] per car) to alleviate its revenue shortage. (Yeung & Li, 
2000, p.632) 
3. After Zhu Rongji becoming Shanghais mayor in 1988, he took 
steps to aid SVW, including encouraging the development of a 
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municipal taxi company that exclusively used the joint-venture 
cars. (Harwit, 1992, p.155) 
5.4.2 Conflict Management system in SVW 
 
Conflicts inevitably arise within the alliance, then how to solve this 
problem and maintain a good relationship with partner becomes a 
serious question. 
 
The most serious conflict occurred in 1988, when China National 
Automotive Industry Corporation (CNAIC), led by Chen Zutao, 
complained about the slow pace of component localization and asked 
Volkswagen to raise its local content utilization to 80 per cent as soon 
as possible. At that stage the local content level was only 12 per cent, 
and it was unrealistic to try and reach the CNAIC target in a short 
period of time as local suppliers could not provide high-quality 
components because of the low level of technology they were using. 
Disregarding these difficulties, CNAIC decided to curtail raw material 
supplies and limit the joint ventures output until the required local 
content target was achieved. This decision was not in conformity with 
the joint venture contract, in which it was clearly specified that the 
Chinese side was responsible for locally supplied high-quality 
components (Harwit, 1992; Tian, 2007). 
 
West German experiences with Socialist East Germany have 
contributed to an understanding of command economies and their 
shortcomings. Therefore, Volkswagen representatives already knew 
what and how to negotiate with the Chinese partners (Luo, 2001, 
p.148). To resolve the conflict, Volkswagen did not choose a forcing or 
legalistic strategy to confront CNAIC openly through media-based or 
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legal procedures. Instead, Volkswagen adopted a problem-solving 
strategy, explaining patiently to CNAIC the difficulties in content 
localization, and persuading the Chinese side through reasoned 
arguments to look for a solution to the problem. The soft-line 
approach worked. The Chinese partners stopped blaming Volkswagen, 
and worked together to form a suppliers association to resolve the 
technical problems in providing high-quality components. The joint 
venture survived the crisis, and is now understood to be doing well 
(Tian, 2007).  
 
Except the soft-line approach worked, the good foresight and precise 
contract provided some respite for the Germans, as it indicated that 
the Chinese, rather than the foreign partners, were responsible for 
the speed of developing Chinese-made parts to meet the Volkswagen 
standard (Harwit, 1992) 
 
Conflicts inevitably arise during the alliance period due to different 
reasons. However, the good foresight, the previous similar experience, 
and the soft-line approach to conflict management made Volkswagen 
more easily solve the conflicts arise during cooperation compare to 
other TNCs in China (e.g. Beijing Jeep, Guangzhou Peugeot) 
 
 
Chapter 6: Case study-Guangzhou Peugeot 
Automotive Co., (GPAC) 
 
6.1 Guangzhou Peugeot Automotive Co. (GPAC) background: 
 
The company was launched in the mid-1980s by Peugeot (22 per cent) 
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and Guangzhou Automobile Group Company (46 per cent). China 
International Trust and Investment corp. hold 20 per cent, and French 
bank and finance companies hold the remaining 12 per cent. GPAC 
manufactures 504 and 505 Peugeot pickups and sedans. Production 
started off slowly, with only 940 units in 1986, the first full year of 
manufacturing production was only 5,666 cars by 1990, but reached 
30,000 units in 1993.  
 
In April 1997, Peugeots management declared its intention to pull out 
of the GPAC joint venture. At the time, this announcement had the 
effect of a thunderbolt in the business world, because this was not the 
recognized failure of an inexperienced small company with no back-up, 
but that of Europes second-ranking automobile manufacturer, an 
investor with an international reputation and experience, particularly 
in developing countries. Hubler and Meschi (2001) think that Peugeot 
case is interesting because it sums up all the problems met by foreign 
partners in joint ventures, and its that case, Peugeots unfortunate 
experience is not unique and it serves as a warning to present and 
future foreign investors in China. 
 
6.2 Partner Selection 
 
Peugeot made a wrong decision in choosing local partner and another 
wrong decision in setting up JV in Guangzhou instead of other Chinese 
provinces, all these led to poor sales and low productivity. 
 
6.2.1 Strategic fit 
 
Peugeot estimated the purchasing power of China was strong enough 
to bring it a new opportunity to grow in Asia. Its strategy is to enter as 
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soon as possible and win the first mover advantage. For the local 
government in Guangzhou, it had an aim to take in technology and 
management know how from more advanced foreign countries, and 
try to push the development of its heavy industry. They try to use the 
example of Peugeots entry to persuade more FDI in heavy industry 
area to come in. Although the two sides had different motives for 
forming the joint venture, both realized that the increase in 
production domestication could help them reach their respective 
goals. 
 
6.2.2 Capacity fit 
 
As what motioned in the literature review, capacity fit is one important 
criterion in selecting the local partner, to access the capability fit, 
TNCs need to evaluate the extent to which the partners in the alliance 
will be capable of meeting each others need, and capable of helping 
each other achieve their respective strategic objectives. Obviously, 
Peugeots Chinese local partner can not meet this requirement, Tian 
(2007) mentioned that Guangzhou Automotive Manufacturing did not 
have the competencies in skilled workers to produce the quality 
components that Peugeot needed, which became one of the main 
reasons for the termination of the alliance. Hubler and Meschi (2001) 
mentioned that the Chinese managers in charge of distribution and 
marketing sometimes did not even know the number of vehicles in 
stock, accounts were kept in a vague manner and marketing was 
paralyzed by administrative conflicts with central authorities. 
 
This joint venture was also affected by rivalry between Guangzhou 
and Guangdong Province itself. As a jihua danlie (independent 
planning unit), Guangzhou reported its economic plan directly to 
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Beijing, thereby establishing a significant degree of financial 
independence from Guangdong Province. There was, therefore, some 
disincentive for the Guangdong government to use its own resources 
to help Guangzhous urban industry. In fact, sources report that 
Guangdong originally opposed the establishment of the Peugeot 
venture, fearing that it would siphon off money destined for 
Guangdong. Former governor Ye Xuanping is said to have given little 
personal support to the project, and provincial authorities reportedly 
chose to develop the Sanxing automotive group in the southern 
Guangdong city of Zhanjiang over Peugeot, to avoid a Guangzhou 
monopoly in the vital industry (Harwit, 1992) 
 
In addition, according to Hubler and Meschi (2001), Guangzhou did 
not have real industrial tradition, sufficient base of industrial suppliers 
and equipment manufactures, for example, there is no one big steel 
plant in Guangdong province, they are located in Shanghai, 
Wuhanetc. And taking other reasons into account, such as frequent 
stoppages of the plant due to lack of suppliers, breakdowns of badly 
maintained robots, and the productivity was less than 50 units per day 
in early 1990s. 
 
6.2.3 Organization fit 
 
Just as what mentioned in SVW case, there was not big difference 
between the domestic automotive manufacturers before 1980s, they 
were all stated-owned, had no previous foreign experience and all 
human management system seemed in the same form, and 
Guangzhou automotive Group is not an exceptional case, it is one of 
them. 
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6.2.4 Summarize 
 
Organization fit does not seem as an important criterion in partner 
selection in 1980s because all domestic partners in China do not have 
big difference at that moment. Strategic and capability fit were more 
important, however Peugeot has not made a good choice base on 
these two partner selection criteria, Peugeot made a wrong decision in 
choosing a capacity unfit local partner and another wrong decision in 
setting up JV in Guangzhou instead of other Chinese provinces, all 
these led to poor sales and low productivity. 
 
 
6.3 Controls over alliance 
 
6.3.1 Host-country (China) regulation: 
 
Refer to Section 4.3.2, the regulation of catalogue for guidance of 
foreign investment industries and the pillar industry policy have 
clearly stated that Automotive industry is one of the pillar industry in 
China, and the proportion of foreign investments in Manufacturing of 
automobile and motorcycle shall not exceed 50%. Therefore, foreign 
companies would not be able to obtain more control over the alliance 
through holding higher percentage of shares (>50%).  
 
In the GPAC, Peugeot took only a 22 per cent share, and took 6 of 11 
board seats (Harwit, 1992), same as the SVW, the foreigner unable to 
gain the absolute power on controlling because of the limitation by 
regulations in China.  
 
6.3.2 Relative strength of partners in GPAC 
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According to Child and Yans (2001) idea, the distribution of 
operational control of the alliance should depend on whether the 
partner have the strength on that control.  
 
In GPAC, that Chinese manager in charge of distribution and 
marketing, and sometimes did not even know the number of vehicles 
in stock (Hubler & Meschi, 2001). In 1980s, China was transferring 
from the command economic system to the free market economic 
system, undoubtedly, Peugeot as the second largest automobile 
manufacturer in Europe, it had more experience and knowledge on 
marketing under the free economic system, and thus it may be better 
for the France side to head the marketing department. This is the 
example to illustrate that GPAC did not fully take advantage of each 
partners strength. Furthermore, there is one more problem about the 
issue of control; Chinese is in charge the public relation department, 
to build a good relationship with the supplier, local and central 
government. Undoubtedly, China side representatives have the 
advantage because of the same cultural background, but the conflicts 
between Guangzhou city and Guangdong Province governments 
make that GPAC can not benefit too much from the policy, hence even 
follow the right instruction to allocate controls, the result may not 
come as expectation due to some other problems (Choosing unfit 
partner). 
 
6.3 Conflict management 
 
This section is going to illustrate the common source of conflict in 
GPAC, and have an introduction of the conflict management system in 
GPAC, try to explain the poor relation between partners. 
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6.3.1Problems Related To Culture Issues and Communication 
 
Cultural issues have long been a challenge to IJVs, which accounts for 
the poor relations between partners (Lane and Beamish, 1990; Zeira 
and Shenkar, 1990). According to Hofstedes Model (1980), Chineses 
culture is very distinctive and characterized by Confucianism while the 
western possess a very different set of culture value. Poor 
management of cultural diversity in PGAC had led to a poor relation 
and misunderstanding between the partners, the problems of cultural 
diversity are examined below. 
 
6.3.1.1 Different Interpretation of Power and Capital Sharing 
 
The cultural differences between the Chinese partner and foreign 
partner led to different interpretation of power and capital sharing in 
GPAC. There are two reasons make the Peugeot think it should have a 
superiority attitude within Peugeot over the local partner. First, the 
tangible asset such as human resource and installations of the 
Chinese partner were depreciated by the foreign partner as they were 
not productive and obsolete, however, the Chinese partner have an 
important intangible assets, local market information and a good 
relation with governments, and these assets are undervalued by 
Peugeot as its value was difficult to determine and open to subjective 
judgment (Hubler and Meschi, 2001). Second, the tangible asset of 
Peugeot was over-valued as it is calculated at its full capacity, however, 
it was never operated up to that potential level due to insufficient 
demand and highly fragmented market. Due to these reasons, 
Peugeot think it was the one who can make this JV work and it should 
have majority control of the JV, even it have less share than its local 
partner. Differently, the Chinese partner did not see things this way; it 
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assumed the sharing of power should according to the value of the 
capital, instead of the importance of superiority of the capital. The 
different interpretation of power and capital sharing in GPAC led to 
cultural clash that severely harmed the harmonious relationship 
between the partners. 
 
6.3.1.2 Importance of Guanxi and Mianzi 
 
The cultural differences also led to another problem in GPAC that was 
divergence of aims and the importance of the Guanxi2 phenomenon 
(Hubler and Meschi, 2001). In most of the IJVs, foreign partners only 
concern about financial returns and performance, but Chinese 
partners often have objectives in economic, social and political side as 
well. According to Chieng (1999, p.111, in Hubler & Meschi, 2001, 
P.169), the foreign partners see the investment as impersonal figure 
while the Chinese partners see it as their region, their parents, their 
friends, and their society where they live. The Chinese partners may 
have an interest in the private lives of their employees, forms a family 
with his customers and suppliers, and if they succeed, their successes 
give themselves responsibilities towards society and their 
representatives. 
 
Except Guanxi, Mianzi3 is another important concept of Chinese 
culture. Chinese regard face as dignity, self-respect and prestige, 
ones social standing and position, as perceived by others (Chen, 
1995, in Hoon-Halbauer,1999), to be polite is to be face-caring 
                                                        
2Guanxi describes the basic dynamic in personalized networks of influence, and is a central 
concept in Chinese society, In Western media, the pŝnyŝn Romanization of this Chinese word 
is becoming more widely used instead of the two common translations"connections" and 
"relationships"as neither of those terms sufficiently reflect the wide cultural implications 
that Guanxi describes. 
3 Mianzi represents social perceptions of a person's prestige 
 72
(Hoon-Halbauer, 1999), causing someone to lose face is a kind of 
disrespect. Some foreign personnel in the JV may not understand this 
concept and lead to some misunderstanding and unhappy experience. 
They may cause the local employees to lose face by hammering on 
the table and yelling their employees in the public (Hoon-Halbauer, 
1999), these actions may lead to resentment towards the foreign 
partner. 
 
6.3.1.3 Problems in Communication 
 
Cultural barrier was one of the failure causes of GPAC since language 
barrier existed in communication between the foreigners and the 
Chinese staff members in the JV. Foreign managers in GPAC normally 
could not speak Chinese and they could only communicate with their 
Chinese colleagues through a third party interpreter, thus many 
misunderstanding happened. Therefore no genuine, direct 
communication between the two parties can take place; 
heart-to-heart talks are unlikely to take place (Hoon-Halbauer, 
1999). Misunderstanding may easily emerge, especially when the 
interpreter is inexperienced, distortion of meaning may be happened 
during translation. Furthermore, French and Chinese are two 
extremely divergent cultures; poor translation will often result in 
catastrophe, even to the extent of both parties becoming downright 
hostile to each other, because their underlying assumptions, concepts 
and ways of thinking deviate so markedly (Hoon-Halbauer, 1999). 
 
Under the lack of open and direct communication, mistrust had also 
emerged between the French and Chinese. In GPAC, expatriate 
manager work with their respective Chinese deputies, when a Chinese 
staff-member had some problems, he approached his fellow manager 
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who spoke the same language, instead of going to his immediate 
French superior (Hoon-Halbauer, 1999). In this case, though mutual 
understanding can be easier to attain when speak in same language, 
but mistrust may arise by contacting others instead of the French 
superior. 
 
6.3.2 Conflict management system in GPAC 
 
Peugeot also prefer to apply the soft-line approach to solve the 
conflicts, but compare to the Volkswagen, it lacks two things: 
experience and positive attitudes. The experience in here is about the 
experience of how to negotiate with Socialist partner. West German 
experiences with Socialist East Germany have make Volkswagen 
understand of command economies and their shortcomings and then 
how to negotiate with its Chinese partner, however, Peugeot has no 
this kind of experience before its entry to China. There is one example 
to illustrate this problem, seeing that sales were not taking off, 
Peugeot proposed to its two Chinese partners that they should widen 
the range of models in production and start assembling private cars. 
Even the Peugeot was finally given the permission to launch the 
saloon car version of 505; it had taken no leas than three years to 
negotiate (Hubler and Meschi, 2001). 
 
Another thing is about the positive attitudes, it refer to a sensitive 
attitude to national a corporate cultural diversity, strong commitment 
by top and lower level management in the JV and mutual trust. 
Cultural diversity is a serious problem in GPAC, and in fact, cultural 
differences generated automatically during the normal functioning of 
an IJV, it exists in all IJVs, such as Shanghai-VW, BJC (Beijing Jeep 
Co.,), and it can eliminated by suing cultural management within the 
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JV, such as providing cross-cultural education, training and workshop 
for the personnel. In the case of GPAC, its primary goal was short 
term and financial oriented, it did not pay attention to the cultural 
differences between parents as well as between the Chinese and 
foreign personnel. These dysfunctions emerged and increased over 
time since GPAC did not give so much attention to relational 
problems when compared with financial issues (Hubler and Meschi, 
2001). Mutual trust actually is the best thing to solve the 
management, but it is what Peugeot did not have. 
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Chapter 7: Implication by comparison and 
conclusion 
 
7.1 Brief conclusion of difference 
 
Based on the case study in Chapter 5 and 6, we can conclude there are 
several differences between the two different JVs in Chinas auto 
industry; their differences can be concluded and present in Table 7.1 
 
Table 7.1 
 
 
Company: SVW GPAC 
Partner 
selection 
Invest in Shanghai, an 
attractive industrial city 
in China; Shanghai 
Automotive Group Co. 
basically meets the 
requirement to form a 
joint venture. 
Select a capacity 
unfit partner, and 
an unfit location. 
Control over 
alliance 
Regulations restrict the 
foreigner gain full control 
over alliance. 
 
Different partners take 
control of different 
aspects of the operation 
depend on what they are 
good at. 
Regulations restrict 
the foreigner gain 
full control over 
alliance. 
 
Have not allocated 
the control power 
based on partners 
strength. 
Conflict 
management  
Good communication 
leads to good 
corporation. 
Soft-line approach. 
Lack of 
communication, 
cannot benefit too 
much from the 
corporation with 
government. 
Soft-line approach, 
but lack of 
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experience and 
positive attitudes. 

 
 
 
7.2 Partner selection: 
 
A partner with superior strategic traits but lacking strong 
organizational and financial characteristics may result in an unstable 
joint venture. The possession of desirable organizational attributes 
without corresponding strategic and financial competence may leave 
the joint venture unprofitable. A partner with superior financial 
strengths without strategic and organizational competencies can lead 
to an unsustainable venture (Luo, 1998). The comparitive cases of 
SVW and Guangzhou Peugeot, illustrates the importance of selecting 
a fit partner to the survival and growth of foreign companies active in 
China. 
 
A foreign investor may not able to find a local partner possessing 
superior attributes in all three categories (strategic, organizational, 
and capacity). Nevertheless, the importance of specific attributes 
within a category is dependent on what the foreign company wants to 
pursue from its venture.  
 
Volkswagen opted for Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation 
which is supported by local and central governments as its local 
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partner, thus it could take advantage of partners local information 
about the market and its Guanxi. Peugeot also chose to cooperate 
with a local partner to entry China, however, its local 
partner-Guangzhou Municipality is only supported by the local 
regional government, and not the Province government, thus, chose it 
as a partner to also ensure that Guangzhou Peugeot is affected by 
rivalry between Guangzhou and Guangdong Province itself. 
 
Furthermore, producing a car needs more than ten thousands parts; it 
is an industry depends largely on the supplier. One problem 
Guangzhou met was procurement of locally produced parts of 
sufficient quality. In addition, the facilities at Guangzhou Auto 
Manufacturing were outdated and its workers poorly trained, and that 
Guangdong had lack of minerals and natural fuels which traditionally 
was home to light industries. Consequently, Guangzhou is not a fit 
location and Guangzhou Auto Manufacturing is not a capability fit 
partner. In contrast, Volkswagen selected Shanghai as its base in 
China, which is a city that has a long history on heavy industry 
development, even its suppliers cannot meet the standard of joint 
venture immediately, but at least it can spend less effort and resource 
on developing it as compared to Guangzhou. 
 
In sum, it is understandable that SVW performed better than GPAC, 
because Peugeot had lost at the beginning process - partner selection. 
 
7.3 Control over alliance 
 
Chinas regulations strictly restricted that foreign companies cannot 
hold more 50% shares of the joint venture and it finally made both 
Volkswagen and Peugeot unable to gain the absolute power of control. 
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Volkswagen got 50% equity shares, and it had the same power as the 
China representatives, sometimes they can affect the important 
decision of the joint venture. However, Peugeot took only 22% share 
and took 5 board seats, if the Chinese representatives could 
implement any policies that can better serves their objectives and 
may hurt partners benefit; Peugeot may be unable to stop them. 
Thus, compare to Volkswagen, Peugeot lose the bargaining position at 
the first stage. 
 
For operational control, Hubler & Meschis paper (2001) mentioned 
that the Chinese manager in charge of distribution and marketing, in 
the 1980s, China was transferring from the command economic 
system to the free market economic system. Undoubtedly, Peugeot 
was the second largest automobile manufacturer in Europe, it had 
more experience and knowledge on marketing under the free 
economic system, thus it may better for the Peugeots representative 
to be in charge of the marketing department, and to have control over 
the respective individual functional areas they are good at. In contrast, 
SVW had a good distribution of power on its different functional areas; 
Volkswagen had the control on the marketing and technology 
department, and Chinas representative had the control on the public 
relations department: the same cultural background made it easy to 
communicate with the local, central government and its 
suppliersetc. 
 
7.4 Conflict management 
 
Both foreign companies faced the cultural divergence problem, but 
through different communications, the results of them are very 
different. Harwit (1992) thought that the success of SVW was largely 
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dependent on foreign and local cooperation and what the most 
important thing in cooperation was communication; good 
communication can lead the both parties to understand each others 
difficulties, and when there are some conflicts between them, 
communication can speedily and efficiently solve the conflicts. 
 
In GPACs case, under the lack of open and indirect communication, 
mistrust had also emerged between the French and the Chinese. And 
when the conflicts arise, what they do is to complain of each other 
rather than to actively communicate with each other and find a way to 
solve the problem. In SVW case, both foreign and local parties 
attempted their best to cooperate with each other to reach their 
objectives. There were two factors that Harwit (1992, p.155) 
mentioned in the success of SVW, one of them was that the shanghai 
government, itself partially represented through its SAIC partnership 
in SVW, took earnest steps to solve problems that were not 
anticipated by the contract. 
 
7.5 Managerial Insight of Successful JV 
 
7.5.1 Positive Partner Attitudes 
 
According to Faulkner & Child (1999), for a JV to be effective the 
partners must have positive attitudes towards the alliance. Positive 
attitudes refer to a sensitive attitude to national and corporate 
cultural diversities (Kanter, 1989), strong commitment by top and 
lower level management in the JV and mutual trust (Anderson & 
Narus, 1990). Inkpen and Crossan (1995) found that if the partners 
do not have positive attitudes towards each other, learning in JV such 
as technology know how and management expertise cannot be 
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facilitated, thus lead to a larger possibility of JV failure. 
 
7.5.2 Clear Organizational Arrangements 
 
A clear organizational arrangement is a key to successful IJV (Faulkner, 
1994, in Dalton et al., 2006) 
 
zEstablish a clear dispute resolution mechanism 
zIn a JV alliance, clear authority should be vested in the chief 
executive 
zAn appropriate legal form 
zAgree on a divorce mechanism 
zSet up processes for wide dissemination of information within the 
alliance 
 
7.5.3 A Learning Philosophy 
 
According to Faulkner (1994, in Dalton et al., 2006), a philosophy of 
constant learning must be adopted by the IJV. If both partners have a 
prime objective to learn from each other, the prognosis for the future 
is much brighter. Especially, in China, the success of JV depends on 
transfer of knowledge, such as technology know how and 
management expertise. If a constant learning philosophy is not 
adopted, the JC may fail.  
 
7.6 Conclusion 
 
TNCs like to enter Chinas auto market because most of them think 
that China has a location advantage  the largest potential domestic 
market, and given the large technology gap, without protections, 
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foreign entries will easily wipe out the domestic player. They can find 
they have advantages on a lot of aspects compared to the domestic 
manufacturers. On the other side, China government also welcome 
the entry of TNCs, but it is conditional. What the Chinese government 
try to do is to foster its own automotive industry and is not interested 
in turning China into an expansion base for TNCs. Thus, a variety of 
regulations and policies are established by government to conditional 
restrict the entry of TNCs, and these policies can be seem as an 
important limitation for TNCs to select an entry model. The import 
control increase the transaction cost of import, the 50% maximize 
share holding regulation made the TNCs necessary to alliance with the 
domestic manufacturers if they choose to invest in China. However, 
while the government close the door to the TNCs, it also opens a 
window for them. There are many favourite policies given to the IJVs 
if they can meet the requirements of the government. 
 
The host countrys regulation and policies do have an effect on TNCs 
entry selection, but the magnitude of the effect may not be as large as 
most people think; if the companies can choose a right strategy while 
they entering, the bad aspects can become positive. Volkswagen is a 
good example: the positive attitude and sufficient communication to 
the partner and SVW benefited quite a lot from the special policy 
treatment and this is what GPAC could not gain during its operation 
time. Instead of complaining that the regulations limitation lead to 
the failure of entry, it is better to see regulation as a certain condition. 
All foreign companies can make the most appropriate reaction 
strategies to this condition. This paper focused on discussing the entry 
strategies of international joint ventures, how to select a fit partner, 
allocation of control, and conflict management, are three issues 
discussed above, and by case study two IJVs: SVW and GPAC, it found 
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that regulation and policy is not the only thing taken into account 
while making an entry choice. The intricacies of the entry strategy is 
more important. By comparing the two cases, we see that select a fit 
partner can help TNCs get something what they did not have before 
and reduce the probability of conflict arising in the future; better 
allocating different operational controls can fully take advantage of 
each partners strength; having positive attitude and sufficient 
communication to the partner can make both parties know more 
about each other and lead to a better corporation in the future. 
 
In sum, regulations and policies cannot be deemed as the only factor 
which leads to the failure of IJV; its difficult to judge that Chinas 
policy as strategic barriers or motives for TNCs to enter Chinas 
automotive market. Excepting policies, companies different 
strategies seemed as a more important factor to determine the 
success of IJVs. Implementing the appropriate strategies can 
translate the policy from as a barrier to a motives, and help the IJVs 
have a more healthy environment to continually grow in the future. 
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Appendixes 
I: Catalogue of Encouraged Foreign Investment Industries 
 
19. Communication and Transportation Equipment Industries  
 
(1) Manufacturing of complete automobiles (foreign investments shall 
not exceed 50%)and construction of automobiles research and 
development organization  
 
(2) Manufacturing of automobile engine, reused manufacture of 
engines and construction of engine research and development 
organization g˖asoline motor with output per litre not lower than 50kw, 
diesel motor with output per litre not lower than 40 kw and discharge 
capacity below 3 liters, diesel motor with output per litre not lower 
than 30 kw and discharge capacity above 3 liters, motor driven by 
such new resources as fuel cells and compound fuel  
 
(3) Manufacturing of key spare parts for automobiles as well as 
research and development of key technologies: complete disc brakes, 
complete driving rods, automatic gearboxes, fuel pumps of diesel 
engine, inhalant supercharger of engines, adhesive axial organ(used 
for four-wheel drive), hydraulic tappet, electronic cluster gauge, 
crankshaft and connecting bar(diesel motor above 8 liters), Antiˉ
Lock Brake System(ABS, ECU, valve body, sensor) , ESP, BBW, 
electronic braking distribution system(EBD) , driving control system, 
gas generator for automobile airbags, electronic fuel injection system, 
sprays technology on fuel common rail technology(utmost spray 
pressure above 1600 pa) , VGT, VNT, discharge control equipment of 
motor meeting the pollutant discharge standard of the fourth phase of 
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China, ITM and coupler assembly, Steer-by-Wire System, Diesel 
Particulate Filter(DPF), intelligent cylinder, special rubber automobile 
components  
 
(4) Production as well as research and development of automobile 
electronic devices: engine and underchassis control system as well as 
key spare parts, in-vehicle electronic technology (automobile 
information system and navigation system)ˈautomobile electronic 
network technology (limited to equity joint ventures) cˈomponents for 
the input (sensor and sampling system) and the output(actuator) of 
electronic control system, EPS electronic controller(limited to equity 
joint ventures) ˈembedded electronic integration system(limited to 
equity joint ventures or contractual joint ventures) , 
electronic-controlled air suspension, ECSˈelectronic valve system 
equipmentˈelectronic throttle, power cell(NiH and Li-con) and control 
system(limited to equity joint ventures) ˈ integrated motor and 
control system(limited to equity joint ventures) ˈwheelboss motor, 
multifunction controller(limited to equity joint ventures) fˈuel cell and 
spare parts thereof, hydrogen storing systems for automobilesˈ
testing system for experiment and maintaining of automobile and 
motorcycle models  
 
(5) Manufacturing of key parts for motorcycle t˖echnology of electrical 
control fuel injection for motorcycle(limited to equity joint ventures or 
contractual joint ventures) , engine discharging device which satisfy 
motorcycle discharging criteria stage ċ of China 
 
Source: Invest in China, [online], available at: 
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Laws/law_en_info.jsp?docid=87
372  
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II: Law on Sino-foreign Cooperative Joint Ventures 
 
Article 4. The State shall encourage the establishment of 
export-oriented or technologically advanced production-type 
co-operative enterprises. 
 
Article 20. A co-operative enterprise may also enjoy favorable 
treatment in the form of a reduction of or exemption from tax 
payments, following its payment of taxes due in accordance with the 
relevant State regulations. 
 
Source: [online], available at: 
http://shenlawfirm.com/china/laws/cjvl.pdf  
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